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a b s t r a c t
Using polyhedral combinatorics and graph theory results, we study unstable families of
coalitions and analyze the effect of adding players or deleting coalitions in order to obtain
a stable family. We also generalize the definitions and results to the case of fractional
participation of players in coalitions.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In cooperative game theory, the coalitions are all the subsets, P (N), of a set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} of players. Certainly, the
number of coalitions is exponentially large, and it may not be feasible in practice to consider all of them, for instance, in
order to evaluate the worth of each. It may even be the case that some of the players in a coalition may not get to meet or
communicate with each other, so that actually some coalitions may not be formed. Therefore, it makes sense to restrict the
attention to subfamilies of coalitionsK , ∅ 6= K ⊂ P (N), eventually with significantly fewer elements than 2n, and in this
case identify properties which are decisive, whether to modify an existing family of coalitions or to design a new one.
In this setting, a natural generalization of the notion of core is theK-core, the set of allocations acceptable to all coalitions
inK according to v : K → R,
C(v,K) = {x ∈ Rn : x(N) ≤ v(N) and x(K) ≥ v for all K ∈ K, K 6= ∅},
where for A ⊂ N and x ∈ Rn we write x(A) =∑i∈A xi.
Assuming from now on that ∅ 6∈ K so as to avoid trivial technical exceptions, we may write the K-core in matricial
terms as
C(v,K) = {x ∈ Rn : x(N) ≤ v(N) andM(K)T x ≥ v} , (1.1)
where M(K) is the matrix whose rows are indexed by the set of players and its columns are the incidence vectors of the
coalitions in K , we identify the function v : K → R with the vector in RK , and denote by a ≥ b the set of inequalities
as ≥ bs, s = 1, . . . , for real vectors a, b of the same dimension.
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The possibility of finding an acceptable allocation to all coalitions inK , that is, C(v,K) 6= ∅, may be expressed with the
aid of the linear program
z∗(v,K) = min{1 · x : M(K)T x ≥ v}, (1.2)
where with 0 and 1we denote the vectors whose components are all zeroes or all ones (not always of the same dimension),
respectively.
The program (1.2) is always feasible, although it may be unbounded, and
C(v,K) 6= ∅ if and only if z∗(v,K) ≤ v(N), (1.3)
and linear programming theory leads to the dual program,
max {v · y : y ≥ 0,M(K)y = 1} . (1.4)
Noticing that the underlying polyhedron,
D(K) = {y ≥ 0 : M(K)y = 1} , (1.5)
is independent of v, and therefore intrinsic toK , we obtain a first classification of families:
Definition 1.6. K is balanced if D(K) 6= ∅. 
Since the entries of M(K) are 0–1, the polytope D(K) has a combinatorial meaning, a particular important case being
when all its extreme points are integer.
Definition 1.7. K is partitionable if D(K) has no fractional extreme points, i.e., either D(K) = ∅ (andK is unbalanced) or
all its extreme points are 0–1. 
Remark 1.8. The definitions of balancedness and partitionability might differ from the usual ones, but see Lemma 2.4 and
Proposition 2.5. 
Balancedness and partitionability are defined in terms of the dual program (1.4), but from the primal side, the important
issue is to find conditions onK so that theK-core is not empty for families of v’s as large as possible, and this is referred
to as the stability ofK .
Different kinds of stability have been studied, and related to balancedness and partitionability. Just to cite a few, let
us mention that Boros et al. [6] studied different types of stability, even in the context of non-transferable utility games
(NTU), showing their equivalence and their relation to partitionability, whereas Gurvich and Vasin [14] and Kaneko and
Wooders [17] proved (see also [4,6]):
Theorem 1.9. A family K is such that C(v,K) 6= ∅ for every superadditive characteristic function v if and only if it is
partitionable.
Individual rationality, i.e., xi ≥ v({i}) for any admissible payoff vector x and any i ∈ N , is a natural assumption in game
theory (see comments in [4,6]), and to enforce it we must require that all singletons be elements ofK , that is, [N] ⊂ K ,
where [N] is the family of all the individual coalitions. In this case, the incidence vectors of the singletons are elements of
D(K), so K is balanced. Nevertheless, in combinatorics the conditions: K is partitionable, and K ∪ [N] is partitionable,
differ a lot. In fact, the second is much stronger than the first one and it is equivalent to the perfectness of a graph associated
withK (known as the intersection graph ofK); see [4,5].
Recalling that a 0–1 matrix A with no zero columns is perfect if the polyhedron {y ∈ Rd : Ay ≤ 1, y ≥ 0} is integral, by
introducing slack variables it follows that:
Theorem 1.10. K0 ∪ [N] is partitionable if and only if M(K0) is perfect.
The main result of [15] (see also [4,6]) states that the following claims are equivalent
1. K ∪ [N] is partitionable;
2. for NTU gamesK is stable;
3. for games in normal form,K is stable.
Finally, in [4,6,18,19] it is shown that they are also equivalent to the perfectness of the intersection graph of K , as in
Theorem 1.10.
Using results by Chvátal [10] (relating perfect graphs and perfect matrices) and Lovász [20] (relating normal hypergraphs
and perfect graphs), we may see how different kinds of stability ofK = K0 ∪ [N] are related to the perfectness ofM(K0)
(see, e.g., [15,19,18,4,6,2]).
On another track, it is very reasonable to think that a player does not fully participate in a coalition either because of a
lack of time for meetings or because of problems in communicating with other members. Alternatively, we may think that
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the player participates with some probability in the coalition. Thus, the study of the fractional participation of players in
coalitions was introduced by Aubin [3], as a fuzzy cooperation between players.
Fuzzy games have been further studied by several authors. Let us just mention here the work of Tijs et al. [24], who
proved that for convex fuzzy games several notions for the core coincide and that the core is the unique stable set, and that
Hsiao and Raghavan [16] introduced multichoice games, closely related to fuzzy games (see also, e.g., [21,23]). We refer the
reader to the book by Branzei et al. [7] and the references therein for further background on these subjects.
This paper is centered around three major concerns: to extend the notion of stability as much as possible, what to do to
bring stability to an unstable family, and what can be done when fractional participation is allowed.
Extending the notion of stability. Most of the previous works deal with characteristic functions defined on all possible
coalitions/subsets, whereas we are concerned with functions defined only on the familyK .
When studying transferable utility games (TU) in characteristic function form we consider a function v : P (N) → R,
which is superadditive if
v(K ′)+ v(K ′′) ≤ v(K ′ ∪ K ′′) for all K ′, K ′′ ⊂ N with K ′ ∩ K ′′ = ∅. (1.11)
But, if v is defined only on a proper subset of coalitionsK , (1.11) may make no sense unless K ∪ K ′ ∈ K whenever K
and K ′ are disjoint members ofK , which is a rather strong demand onK .
Thus, unless explicitly stated, we do not assume superadditivity in what follows. Let us mention in passing that since we
ask ∅ 6∈ K , neither do we assume the condition v(∅) = 0 in what follows.
After presenting some more definitions and background results in Section 2, in Section 3 we introduce a new type of
stability – weaker than those considered before – which is initially defined on a small subset of characteristic functions but
shown to hold for a larger family than those of superadditive functions which need not be defined on the whole of P (N),
and prove several results in the spirit of Theorem 1.9, such as the equivalence between partitionability and stability.
Making stable an unstable family. In Section 4 we consider the problem of how can an unstable family be modified as little as
possible so as to obtain stability, a problem which we have not seen addressed in the literature.
We show thatwemay always add a single player to someof the coalitions (without increasing the number of coalitions) in
an unstable familyK and obtain a stable familyK ′. We present different kinds of added player, such as the dummy player,
participating in no coalition, and the mediator, participating in every coalition. In general, the resulting family will result
stable but unbalanced, but we show that in some cases the family is also balanced (see, e.g., Theorem 4.2 and Remark 4.3).
Of course, we can always single out a player from the original set N , and remove or add her/him to different coalitions,
so that we obtain similar results without the explicit addition of any player.
The techniques for bringing stability used in Section 4 imply that, in general, for any v : K → R there will always be
allocations in theK ′-core violating individual rationality, so that in Section 5 we turn to the study of families of the form
K ∪[N], coupling Chvátal’s results [10] and the theory of antiblocker duality developed by Fulkerson [12] (see also [11,22]).
In Section 5.1 we study the effect of adding players in order to obtain a balanced and stable family, and in Section 5.2 we
study the deletion of coalitions. It is natural, then, to study instability indices of a familyK containing [N] as we consider in
Section 5.3: theminimumnumber of players to be added in order tomake the family stable (in the casewhere the associated
graph is perfect, i.e., having no chordless odd cycle of length at least 5 nor its complement as node-induced subgraphs) and
the minimum number of coalitions to be deleted in order to obtain a stable family.
Let us remark that we do not include in our study removal of players or addition of coalitions. In general, after removing
a minimal set of players in order to obtain stability, many properties of the given family are not preserved. Moreover, the
problem of finding such a set of players is NP-complete. Finally, using graph theoretical results it is not difficult to prove
that the addition of coalitions to an unstable family never helps in finding a new stable family.
Fractional participation. The addition of players to obtain stability (as studied in Sections 4 and 5) is related to the addition
of constraints which eliminate fractional extreme points, and in general these constraints – and hence the participation of
the added players – will have fractional coefficients.
As fuzzy games are a well established extension of the traditional theory, in Section 6 we consider how the inclusion of
the fractional participation of players modifies the results of the previous sections.
Although not difficult, this extension is not quite straightforward. For example, there might be integer extreme points of
the analog of D(K)which are not 0–1 (Example 6.9).
With suitable definitions (some of them differing from the fuzzy case), we obtain several results similar to those of the
previous sections, such as that stability and partitionability coincide (Theorem 6.18). Among other results, we show that
an unstable family of classical coalitions containing the individual coalitions can be made stable by the addition of players
(with fractional participation) if we do not ask for the individual rationality of the added players (Theorem 6.23), but this
cannot be always done for fractional coalitions (Example 6.28).
As a concluding comment, let us point out that the closely related subject of the design of stable families of coalitions is
not a simple task. For instance, a naive possibility is to arrange the n players on a circle, and, choosing some k < n/2, decide
that every subset of k consecutive players will form a coalition. Our results show that, even when adding the individual
coalitions (i.e., [N]), it is not possible to obtain a balanced and stable family unless k = 1 or k = 2 and n is even.
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2. Further definitions and background
In this section we present some further notations and definitions (which may differ from those in other sources), and
some results which we need.
We denote by χ(A, i) the indicator function of A ⊂ N evaluated at i ∈ N , so that (χ(A, 1), χ(A, 2), . . . , χ(A, n)) is the
incidence vector of A in N . A \ B denotes the set difference of the sets A and B.
The support (or carrier) of y : K → R+ is the subfamily
supp(y,K) = {K ∈ K : y(K) > 0}.
Recalling (1.2)–(1.4) and the definition of balancedness, we obtain:
Lemma 2.1. The following are equivalent:
• K is unbalanced,
• z∗(v,K) = −∞ for some v : K → R,
• z∗(v,K) = −∞ for all v : K → R.
In either case, C(v,K) 6= ∅ for any v : K → R.
Conversely, if K is balanced, the programs (1.4) and (1.2) have a finite optimum for any v : K → R.
Denoting by eK the 0–1 vector having exactly a 1 in the K -th position, if N ∈ K thenM(K)eN = 1, and therefore:
Lemma 2.2. If N ∈ K thenK is balanced.
A balanced weighting of K is a functionw : K → Z+, such that for somem ∈ Z,m > 0,∑
K∈K
χ(K , i)w(K) = m for every i ∈ N, (2.3)
and in this case we say thatw hasmultiplicity m.
(2.3) may be written in matricial form as
M(K)w = m 1,
so that balanced weightings and fractional (including integer) elements of D(K) are in one to one correspondence. Since
D(K) is bounded and defined by rational inequalities, when not empty its extreme points are always rational, yielding the
more traditional notion of balancedness (instead of Definition 1.6):
Lemma 2.4. K is balanced if and only if it has a balanced weighting.
A partition is a balancedweighting ofmultiplicity 1 (in this case its support is a set partition ofN), andw : K → R is a sum
of partitions if there exist partitionswj : K → {0, 1} and non-negative integers αj, j = 1, . . . , `, such thatw =∑`j=1 αjwj.
Since we are assuming ∅ 6∈ K , it follows that (recall Definition 1.7):
Proposition 2.5. K is partitionable if and only if any balanced weighting of K is a sum of partitions.
3. Stability
In this sectionwe introduce a notion of stabilitywhich is a variant of others considered beforewithout the superadditivity
restriction, and show results similar to Theorem 1.9, e.g., that stable families and partitionable families coincide.
In the context of TU and NTU games it is proved in [14,15] the results in Theorems 3.10 and 3.11. These results were also
independently proved in [18].
Associated with any family of coalitions K , Boros, Gurvich and Vasin [6] considered a particular superadditive
characteristic function which we use extensively. Denoting by K the family obtained from K by adding all the unions
of pairwise disjoint coalitions inK , they defined vK : P (N)→ R by
vK(K) = max{|K ′| : K ′ ∈ K, K ′ ⊂ K},
(so that vK(K) = 0 if K ′ 6⊂ K for all K ′ ∈ K) and proved:
Lemma 3.1. vK is superadditive, takes nonnegative integer values and satisfies
vK(K) = |K | for all K ∈ K and vK(K) < |K | for all K 6∈ K, K 6= ∅.
Notice that ifw is a balancedweighting ofK , then supp(w,K) ⊂ K . For simplicity, in this casewewrite vw for vsupp(w,K).
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Definition 3.2. A family of coalitions K is stable if either it is unbalanced (and therefore C(v,K) 6= ∅ for any v by
Lemma 2.1) or C(vw,K) 6= ∅ for every balanced weightingw ofK . 
The discussion of the primal/dual pair of linear programs in (1.2) and (1.4), and the fundamental relationship (1.3) lead
immediately to:
Lemma 3.3. A balanced familyK is stable if and only if
z∗(vw,K) ≤ vw(N) (3.4)
for every balanced weighting w of K .
We study now how stability and partitionability are related.
Theorem 3.5. If K is stable then it is partitionable.
Proof. If D(K) = ∅ thenK is partitionable, so let us assume D(K) 6= ∅, and let y be a fractional extreme point of D(K).
Fix m ∈ Z, m > 1, such that w = my is integral. Then, M(K)w = m 1, w is a balanced weighting of K , and


















χ(K , i)yK . (3.6)
Now, since y ∈ D(K),∑
K∈K
χ(K , i)yK = (M(K)y)i = 1 for all i ∈ N,
and (3.6) implies vw(N) ≥ |N| (= n). Moreover, by definition of vw , we must have vw(N) ≤ |N|, and therefore equality
holds in (3.6), i.e.,
|N| = max{|K | : K ∈ supp(w,K)}.
In turn, Lemma 3.1 implies that N ∈ supp(w,K), and either N ∈ supp(w,K) or it is a disjoint union of elements of
supp(w,K).
Let K̂ be a family of disjoint elements of K (eventually with just one member) such that ∪K∈K̂ K = N , and define
w1 ∈ {0, 1}K by
w1K =
{
1 if K ∈ K̂,
0 otherwise.
SinceM(K)w1 = 1, thenw1 ∈ D(K). Now, ifw2 = w − w1, we obtain
M(K)w2 = M(K)w −M(K)w1 = (m− 1) 1, sinceM(K)w = m 1,
w2K = myK − w1K ≥ 0, sincew = my is integral,
so that 1m−1w













Since y is an extreme point of D(K), we must have y = w1, but then y is not fractional. 
Ifw is a balanced weighting ofK (andK is balanced), the definitions of supp(w,K) and vw imply that if K̂ is a disjoint
family of elements ofK , then∑
K∈K̂
vw(K) ≤ vw(N). (3.7)
Indeed, these inequalities are implied by superadditivity, and the characteristic functions vw are superadditive
(Lemma 3.1). However, the inequalities (3.7) are weaker (recall also the discussion on superadditivity after (1.11)), and
motivate the following definition:
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Definition 3.8. v : K → R is aW-function (for the familyK) if∑
K∈K̂
v(K) ≤ v(N) for all set partitions K̂ ⊂ K. (3.9)
(If there is no set partition contained inK , any v : K → R is aW-function.) 
We show now that partitionability implies a seemingly stronger condition than stability.
Theorem 3.10. If K is partitionable then C(v,K) 6= ∅ for everyW-function v.
Proof. IfK is unbalanced, the result follows from Lemma 2.1.
Suppose D(K) 6= ∅. SinceK is partitionable, for any given v : K → R,
max {v · y : y ∈ D(K)}







If v is a W-function, the right-hand side in this equality is bounded above by v(N), since the inequality (3.9) holds, and
therefore ŷ ∈ C(v,K) 6= ∅. 
Using the previous results we obtain the equivalence between stability and partitionability, analogous to Theorem 1.9:
Theorem 3.11. K is stable if and only if it is partitionable.
Proof. If the family is unbalanced it is stable andpartitionable. On the other hand, ifK is balanced and stable, by Theorem3.5
it is partitionable. Finally, ifK is balanced and partitionable, the stability follows from Theorem 3.10 and Lemma 3.3. 
4. Adding one player to obtain stability
We now address the problem of how can new players be added to the coalitions of an unstable family K in order to
obtain a stable familyK ′, allowing the modification of the original coalitions, but without increasing the number of them.
Thus, if the new set of players is N ′ forming coalitionsK ′, then N ( N ′ and |K| = |K ′|.
There is the question on how to relateW-functions v : K → R andW-functions v′ : K ′ → R. For example, we may ask
v(K) = v′(K ′) whenever K = K ′ ∩ N , or perhaps the addition of players modifies the worth of each coalition (even if the
latter remain unmodified). It could be that v is already defined on the whole ofP (N), and we may just consider v′ to be the
restriction of v toK ′. Finally, if v′ : K ′ → R and x ∈ C (v′,K ′), the possibility arises that xi = 0 for i ∈ N ′ \N , that is, every
added player neither gets nor receives, and this may or may not be a desirable situation. In conclusion, the choice is quite
arbitrary and it might depend on the concrete situation to be modeled.
In this section we consider the addition of just one player, n + 1, to the set of players N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, so that
N ′ = N ∪ {n+ 1}.
We assume that K is unstable, and that the player n + 1 has been included in a subset S of coalitions in K . Thus, for
K ′ ∈ K ′ either K ′ = K ∪ {n+ 1} for some K ∈ S, or K ′ = K for some K ∈ K \ S.
Setting A = M(K) and denoting its rows by ai, i ∈ N , let us assume that A′ = M(K ′) has been obtained from A by
appending the (n+ 1)-th row an+1,
an+1,K =
{
1 if K ∈ S,
0 otherwise.
If K is unstable, then it is balanced and not partitionable, i.e., D(K) = {y ∈ RK : Ay = 1, y ≥ 0} is bounded, non
empty, and has fractional (in fact, non-integral) extreme points. The polyhedron D(K ′) is obtained by adding the equality
an+1 · y = 1 to the linear system defining D(K), so that D(K ′) ⊂ D(K).
Hence, if we want K ′ to be stable we have to eliminate all fractional extreme points of D(K), either by leaving only
integer extreme points or by makingK ′ unbalanced. In general it is impossible to eliminate all fractional extreme points by
using just one equality. Even if possible, the task might be too difficult, except for some cases as shown in Theorem 4.2 and
Remark 4.3.
A simple solution is to add an equality incompatible with the ones defining D(K), so as to make D(K ′) = ∅. In this case,
it is straightforward to describe the resulting polyhedral structure:





is not empty and unbounded.








is unbounded) are independent of v′.




, then dn+1 6= 0.
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There is a number of ways – perhaps too many – by which we can add the player n+ 1 to some of the coalitions so as to
makeK ′ unbalanced, and we mention just a few simple ones.
The first possibility is to consider that the player n+1 is a dummy or excluded player (with respect to the familyK ′), that
is, she does not participate in any coalition inK ′, i.e., S = ∅ and an+1 = 0. The system A′y = 1 is infeasible, and therefore




has no ray of of the form
(d, 1), but (0,−1) is a ray of C (v′,K ′). Thus, the incorporation of a dummy player makes the family stable, but intuitively
this is at the expense of having her/him to pay for at least some of what is missing.
A symmetrical possibility to the dummy player is to consider that the player n+ 1 participates in every coalition inK ′,
i.e., S = K , and an+1 = 1. In this case we may say that the added player is a mediator, since her incorporation to the set of
players has transformed an unstable family of coalitions into a stable one.
Unlike the dummy player case, however,K ′ may be balanced. In fact:
Theorem 4.2. If D(K) 6= ∅ and S = K , thenK ′ is balanced if and only if N ∈ K .
In either case, D(K ′) = {eN}, and if v′ is anyW ′-function, then z∗(v′,K ′) = v′(N ′), C
(
v′,K ′
) 6= ∅, and x(N ′) = v′(N ′)
for all x ∈ C (v′,K ′) (i.e., x is efficient).
Proof. IfK ′ is balanced and y ∈ D(K ′), recalling that ai denotes the i-th row of A′ we have:
yK ≥ 0 for all K ∈ K and ai · y = 1 for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n+ 1.
For any K ∈ K and any i ∈ N , we cannot have yK > 0 and i 6∈ K , since we would have ai,K = χ(K , i) = 0 and
1 = ai · y < 1 · y = 1. Therefore, the only coalition in the support of y is N , i.e., N ∈ K and y = eN .
For the converse, if N ∈ K and S = K then N ′ ∈ K ′, and the result follows from Lemma 2.2. 
Hence, if N ∈ K , we are in a rather ideal position when adding a mediator.
On the other hand, if S = K andK ′ is unbalanced, then for any characteristic function v′ on N ′, C (v′,K ′) has no rays
of the form (d,−1), and C (v′,K ′) has rays of the form (d, 1). Thus, if N 6∈ K , for any function v′ defined onK ′ there will
be always allocations in the correspondingK ′-core which will assign the mediator a positive amount of money, as large as
desired.
As a final example, let us consider the case where the player n + 1 is added to just one coalition, K0, ofK . That is, we
have S = {K0} and
an+1,K =
{
1 if K = K0,
0 otherwise.
Although it is easy to exhibit examples where an appropriate choice of K0 makesK ′ unbalanced, we have:
Remark 4.3. IfK = [N] ∪K0 is unstable, then the addition of the player to a single arbitrary coalition makes D(K ′) 6= ∅,
i.e.,K ′ is balanced.
For, if the player is added to one of the individual coalitions, then y ∈ RK defined by
yK =
{
1 if K = {i} for some i ∈ N,
0 in any other case,
belongs to D(K ′).
Similarly, if the player is added to a single coalition Kj ∈ K0, and y ∈ RK is defined by
yK =
{1 if K = Kj,
1 if K = {i} for some i ∈ N \ Kj,
0 otherwise,
then y ∈ D(K ′). 




of the form (d, 1), and consequently there are rays of the form (d,−1). Moreover, yK0 < 1 for every y ∈ D(K).
As is to be suspected, adding the player n + 1 to just one coalition is an intermediate case between the dummy player
and the mediator cases. It is similar to the dummy player in that, providedK ′ is unbalanced, for any characteristic function
defined on N ′ we may find allocations in the correspondingK ′-core for which she/he pays as much as desired. Unlike the
dummy player and resembling the mediator, sometimes the resulting familyK ′ may be balanced.
Example 4.4. LetK = {{2, 3}, {2, 4}, {3, 4}, {1, 5}, {1}}. In this case,
M(K) =

0 0 0 1 1
1 1 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0
0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
 , D(K) = {(1/2, 1/2, 1/2, 1, 0)},
and the family is balanced but unstable.
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If we add one player to every coalition, amediator, there is no solution in the core forwhich this newplayer loses asmuch
as we want. Nevertheless, there is a solution in which she/he obtains some profit and we can find it by complementarity
conditions. For example, (−1,−1/2,−1/2,−1/2, 0, 1) is a ray of C (v′,K ′) for any characteristic function v′ on N ′.
It is clear that we can add one player to one coalition and the resulting family is balanced but unstable. In this case, it is
enough to add a player to coalition number 4 and then D(K ′) = D(K).
If we want to add the new player to only one coalition, in order to obtain an unbounded core we have to add it to any of
the three first coalitions. Adding her/him to the first coalitionwe have that (1,−1/2, 0,−1/2,−1,−1) is a ray of C (v′,K ′)
for any characteristic function v′ on N ′. 
Example 4.5. Let N = {1, 2, 3} andK = [N] ∪K0 = [N] ∪ {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}}. Then,
M(K) =
[1 0 0 1 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 1
0 0 1 0 1 1
]
,
D(K) = {(0, 0, 0, 1/2, 1/2, 1/2), (0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0), (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1), (1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0)},
and the family is balanced but unstable.
In this case, adding one player to only one coalition inK0 always makes the family balanced and stable. 
5. Individual rationality
In this section we consider the effect of modifying an unstable family of the formK = K0 ∪ [N], withK0 ∩ [N] = ∅,
either by adding players or deleting coalitions.
5.1. Adding several players to obtain stability
Unlike the preceding section, when extending the family by the addition of players, we now include the individual
coalitions formed by the added players. Therefore, if the new set of players is N ′, the new family of coalitions is of the
formK ′ = K ′0 ∪ [N ′], and the new players are added to (some of) the coalitions inK0, so that |K ′0| = |K0|.
As discussed in the Introduction, the polyhedra D(K) and D(K ′) are non empty, bothK andK ′ are balanced, stability
and partitionability are equivalent (Section 3), and we are in the conditions of Theorem 1.10.
Given a 0–1matrixM , letG(M) denote the graphwith node set the set of columns ofM andwhere two nodes are adjacent
if there is a row in M with two ones in their corresponding positions. Now there are only two possibilities for an unstable
familyK: either the corresponding graph G(M(K0)) is not perfect, or this graph is perfect butM(K0) is not a clique-node
matrix.
If the graph G(M(K0)) is not perfect, we may bring it to perfection by adding edges (and hence players) so that there are
no induced chordless odd cycles or induced complements of chordless odd cycles.
In all, the study of stability in the present context is reduced to the study of the polyhedron P(K0) = {x ≥ 0 :
M(K0)x ≤ 1}, and the convex hull of its integer feasible solutions, P(K0)∗, so that stability of K is equivalent to having
P(K0) = P(K0)∗.
Let us note that the integer solutions of P(K0) correspond precisely to set partitions of N formed only with elements of
K . The following theorem shows that we can add players while keeping the original set partitions. Its proof also tells us
how many players we need to add and where to add them.
Theorem 5.1. Let K = K0 ∪ [N] be an unstable family of coalitions. There is a set of players we can add to a set of coalitions in
K0 such that the new familyK ′ = K ′0 ∪ [N ′] is stable and P(K0)∗ = P(K ′0)∗ if and only if the graph G(M(K0)) is perfect.
Proof. Let us writeM = M(K0), P = P(K0),M ′ = M(K ′0), P ′ = P(M ′), P∗ = P(K0)∗, P ′∗ = P(K ′0)∗,
(⇒) Dominated rows in M do not affect the polyhedron P , therefore we may assume that we have a minimal description
of P . In case we have dominated inequalities (players) we can delete them, analyze the family without them and add them
back after obtaining a stable familyK ′. (We come back to this kind of situation in Remark 5.2.)
P is a relaxation of P∗, and the addition of players corresponds to the addition of 0–1 rows to thematrixM . By hypothesis,
by adding them we obtain the matrix M ′ which defines P∗, and therefore this convex hull admits a description by 0–1
inequalities.
By antiblocker duality, the rows of M ′ (after removal of dominated rows) are the non-zero extreme points of its
antiblocker polyhedron, P ′c . If the extreme points of this polyhedron are integral, it coincides with the convex hull of its
integer solutions, that is, P ′c = P(a(M))c , where a(M) is the antiblocker matrix of M . Since these two polyhedra coincide,
so do P∗ and P(a(a(M))). Moreover, sinceM is not perfect, the matrixM is not a clique-node matrix but G(M) = G(M ′) and
G(M) is perfect.
(⇐) Since the graph G(M) is perfect andM is not a clique-node matrix, there is a set of cliques Q1, . . . ,Q` that do not have
its incidence vector within the rows of G(M). Therefore, adding ` players, i1, . . . , i`, in such a way that player ik participates
precisely in the coalitions determining Qk, k = 1, . . . , `, we obtain a clique-node matrix of the graph G(M), and the family
obtained after this addition is stable. 
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Fig. 5.1. The graph G(K0) in the Example 5.3.
Remark 5.2. Consider a family including all the individual coalitions. Suppose that player 1 participates in a set A1 of
coalitions, player 2 in A2 coalitions and that A1 ( A2. It is clear that player 1 does not change the stability or instability
of the family and we call her/him an unessential player.
In this case, in the program (1.4) we can replace the variable y2 by y1 + y2 and solve the problem without y1. This
corresponds to the deletion of the unessential player in the original family of coalitions and allows us to work in lower
dimensions. 
Example 5.3. Let N = {1, . . . , 7} and




1 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 1 1 0 0
 .
It is clear that the familyK is unstable. Moreover, M(K0) is not the clique-node matrix of G(K0) (Fig. 5.1), which is a
perfect graph.
The set of maximal cliques that are not rows ofM(K0) is
F = {{1, 2, 3}, {4, 5, 6}}.
From the previous lemma we know that if we add two players (one to the first three coalitions and another to the last three
coalitions) we obtain a stable family that preserves the set of partitions of the given family.
That is,
K ′0 = {{1, 3, 8}, {1, 2, 8}, {2, 3, 7, 8}, {4, 6, 7, 9}, {5, 6, 9}, {4, 5, 9}}.
M(K ′0) is a perfect matrix, andK ′ = K ′0 ∪ [{1, . . . , 9}] is stable. 
Let us present a discouraging result: the number of players which we need to add in order to obtain a stable family can
be exponentially large, even under the hypothesis of Theorem 5.1, as the following example shows.
Example 5.4. A Moon–Moser graph Gn = (Vn, En) of complexity n contains n components S1, S2, . . . , Sn such that every
component Si has 3 isolated nodes, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and En = {(u, v) : u ∈ Si, v ∈ Sj and i 6= j}.
A Moon–Moser graph contains 3n cliques, and is perfect since the complementary graph is a set of disjoint triangles. We
show the Moon–Moser graph G3 in Fig. 5.2. 
In order to avoid this bad behavior it could be reasonable, in the context of game theory, to limit the size of the coalitions.
In this case, we also limit the number of coalitions we need to add in order to obtain stability.
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Fig. 5.2. Moon–Moser graph G3 .
5.2. Deletion of coalitions to obtain stability
Let us analyze the effect of deleting coalitions, which corresponds to deletion of nodes in the graph G(M(K0)). The
problem is then to find a set of nodes of minimum cardinality such that by deleting them from G(M(K0)) we obtain a
perfect graph, and it is clear that we can always do so.
Lemma 5.5. Given an unstable family of coalitionsK = K0 ∪ [N] such that M(K0) is an n× m clique-node matrix, there is a
set of k coalitions, 1 ≤ k ≤ m− 1, such that by deleting them fromK0 the resulting familyK ′ is stable.
Proof. Since M(K0) is a clique-node matrix, the graph G(K0) is imperfect. It is clear that there is a set of nodes we can
delete from G(K0) in order to destroy all the forbidden structures in the graph. Let us assume that the minimum number
of nodes is k, and since nodes correspond to coalitions, let {C1, . . . , Ck} be such a set of nodes in G(M(K0)). Therefore
G′ = G(M(K0)) \ {C1, . . . , Ck} is perfect. IfK ′ = K0 \ {C1, . . . , Ck} then it is stable. 
Example 5.6. LetK = K0 ∪ [{1, . . . , 10}] so that
M(K0) =

1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

,
and the graph G(M(K0)) is shown in Fig. 5.3.
In this case, it is easy to check that by deleting only one coalition the family remains unstable (or equivalently, leaves
the graph imperfect). Nevertheless, there is a set of two coalitions (for example, coalitions 1 and 5) such that after deleting
them we obtain a perfect graph.
Let us suppose that we have deleted these two coalitions thus arriving at the familyK ′0 where
M(K ′0) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 1

.
Let us note that by deletion of coalitions we may arrive at unessential players, but in order to preserve a little more the
structure of the original game we can preserve them in the game. 
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Fig. 5.3. The graph G(M(K0)) in Example 5.6.
Fig. 5.4. The graph G(K0) in the Example 5.7.
If the graph G(M(K0)) is not perfect, we can delete coalitions in order to obtain a perfect subgraph of it, G′, and then add
players (without changing the graph G′) in order to have a stable family.
Let us point out that the deletion of coalitions and the addition of players do not commute, that is, wemay obtain different
results depending on the order on which these operations are done. The following example illustrates this behavior.
Example 5.7. Let N = {1, . . . , 7} and




1 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0
1 0 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 1
 ,
and it is readily seen that the familyK is unstable. Moreover,M(K0) is not the clique-nodematrix of G(K0) (Fig. 5.4) which
is not a perfect graph.
There is only one clique whose incidence vector is not a row ofM(K0) is
F = {{1, 2, 6}}.
Then, adding one player to the first, the second and the 6-th coalitions, M(K ′) is a clique-node matrix (with unessential
players). That is,
K ′0 = {{1, 5, 7, 8}, {1, 2, 6, 8}, {6, 7, 8}, {2, 3}, {3, 4}, {4, 5}}.
Nevertheless, the graph G(M(K ′0)) did not change, that is, it is not perfect. In order to make the family K ′ stable we can
delete any of the first five new coalitions.
If we delete any coalition but the sixth, the resulting graph is perfect. Suppose we delete the first coalition. In this case,
there is no need to add players since the submatrix of M(K0) obtained after deleting the first column is a clique-node
matrix. 
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5.3. Instability indices
In polyhedral combinatorics and graph theory there are different kinds of indices defined in order to measure different
properties, such as the disjunctive index of a matrix [1] or the imperfection index of a graph [13], among others. In our case,
it is appropriate to measure the instability of a family of coalitions.
Given an unstable family of coalitions K = K0 ∪ [N] such that M(K0) is an n × m matrix, we may consider two
important numbers: c(K) and p(K). c(K) is the minimum number of coalitions we have to delete to obtain a perfect
subgraph of G(M(K0)), and p(K) is the minimum number of players we need to add to obtain a stable family when the
associated graph is perfect. It is clear that c(K) is bounded from above by the number of coalitions, and that p(K) = 0 and
c(K) = 0 correspond to a stable familyK .
Example 5.8. If K is the family of coalitions in Example 5.3, p(K) = 2 and c(K) = 0. For the family in Example 5.6,
c(K) = 2. 
Example 5.9. Consider the family in Example 5.7. In order to have a stable family we have to obtain a clique-node matrix
of a perfect graph. LetK ′1 the family obtained after the deletion of the first coalition. Then p(K
′
1) = 0 and c(K ′1) = 0.
LetK ′2 the family obtained fromK after the addition of a player as in the Example 5.6, then p(K
′
2) = 0 and c(K ′2) = 1. 
In order to obtain the instability indices of a familyK = K0 ∪ [N], we may proceed as follows:
• If the matrixM(K0) is a clique-node matrix and G(M(K0)) is a perfect graph, then p(K) = c(K) = 0 and the family is
stable.
• If G(M(K0)) is a perfect graph, the number of players we need to add to make the matrix clique-node is p(K) and
c(K) = 0.
• If G(M(K0)) is not a perfect graph, there is a set of nodes (coalitions) of minimum cardinality, c(K), such that after
deleting it from the graph we obtain a perfect graph. LetK ′ denote the resulting family. Then, there is a set of players
we can add toK ′ such that the new family is stable but in general p(K) 6= p(K ′).
As a final remark on this topic, we observe that determining the instability indices is in general a difficult task. Although
it is possible to decide in polynomial time whether a 0–1matrix is clique-node or a graph is perfect (see [11, Theorem 3.9]
and [8,9]), determining a minimum set of rows to be added in order to make a matrix clique-node may demand a non-
polynomial amount of time.
6. Fractional participation of players
In this section we study how the fractional participation of players modifies the results of the previous sections.
Definition 6.1. A fractional coalition, or f -coalition for short, is a vector of the form F = (a1,F , a2,F , . . . , an,F ), where
ai,F ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1]n, meaning that the player i participates in the f -coalition the fractional amount ai,F . 
Remark 6.2. f -coalitions are called fuzzy coalitions by other authors (see, e.g., the book by Branzei et al. [7]). However we
have changed the nomenclature since their union (defined below) is conceptually different. 
If K ⊂ N , the f -coalition (χ(K , 1), χ(K , 2), . . . , χ(K , n)) is denoted by Kf . In particular, the grand coalition is written as
the f -coalition
Nf = (1, 1, . . . , 1) = 1.
For a given finite family F of f -coalitions,1 we consider the matrixM(F )with entries ai,F , i ∈ N and F ∈ F , we identify
functions v : F → Rwith vectors in RF , and define the F -core by (cf. Eq. (1.1)),
C(v,F ) = {x ∈ Rn : v(Nf ) ≥ x(N) andM(F )T x ≥ v} .
The linear programs (1.2) and (1.4) have similar transliterations: if
z∗(v,F ) = min{1 · x : M(F )T x ≥ v},
and




max{v · y : y ∈ D(F )} if D(F ) 6= ∅,
−∞ for any v if D(F ) = ∅.
The relation (1.3) holds as well:
C(v,F ) 6= ∅ if and only if z∗(v,F ) ≤ v(Nf ),
and we may define:
1 We study only finite families of f -coalitions.
N.E. Aguilera, M.S. Escalante / Discrete Applied Mathematics 158 (2010) 379–396 391
Definition 6.4. The finite family F of f -coalitions is balanced if D(F ) 6= ∅. 
The definition of f -coalition forces us to extend notions such as cardinality or subset. It is natural to define the f -cardinal





so that for K ⊂ N we have σ(Kf ) = |K |.
Similarly, we may say that given two f -coalitions, F1 and F2, then F1 is a f -subcoalition of F2, in symbols F1 @ F2, if
ai,F1 ≤ ai,F2 for all i ∈ N .
It is more delicate to decide when two f -coalitions are disjoint or what their union is. In fuzzy theory the operations
∧ (minimum) and ∨ (maximum) play the role of intersection and union, respectively (see [7, Chapter 5]), but it is more





and in this case define their f -disjoint union by
F1 unionsq F2 =
(




σ(F1 unionsq F2) = σ(F1)+ σ(F2).
We may similarly define the f -disjoint union of subfamily F̂ of (distinct) f -coalitions, unionsqF∈F̂ F , and say that F̂ is a f -
partition if
unionsqF∈F̂ F = Nf .
Example 6.5. Consider N = {1, 2, 3} and F = {F1, F2, F3}where
F1 = (1, 0, 1/2), F2 = (0, 1, 1/2), F3 = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3).
Then,
M(F ) =





Since (1, 1, 0) ∈ D(F ), F is balanced. Also, F1 and F2 are f -disjoint and Nf = F1 unionsq F2, so that {F1, F2} is a f -partition, but
not a set partition. 
As is the case with the usual coalitions, f -partitions and 0–1 extreme points of D(F ) are in a one to one correspondence.
For, given an f -partition F̂ contained in F , we may define y ∈ RF by
yF =
{
1 if F ∈ F̂ ,
0 if F ∈ F \ F̂ , (6.6)
and it is clear that y ∈ D(F ). Similarly, if y ∈ D(F ) is 0–1, its support,
supp(y,F ) = {F ∈ F : yF > 0},
is an f -partition.
A family F of f -coalitions is partitionable if either D(F ) = ∅ or all the extreme points of D(F ) are 0–1.
Example 6.7. Consider N = {1, 2, 3} and F = {F1, F2}with








and D(F ) = ∅. Thus, F is unbalanced and partitionable. 
392 N.E. Aguilera, M.S. Escalante / Discrete Applied Mathematics 158 (2010) 379–396
Example 6.8. Consider N = {1, 2} and F = {F1, F2, F3}where








The extreme points of D(F ) are (1, 1, 0) and (1/3, 0, 2), so that F is balanced but not partitionable. 
Example 6.9. Consider N and F as in Example 6.5. Although the extreme points of D(F ) – (1, 1, 0) and (0, 0, 3) – are
integral, not all of them are 0–1, so that F is balanced and not partitionable. 
Example 6.10. Consider N = {1, 2, 3} and F = {F1, F2, F3}where
F1 = (1, 0, 1/2), F2 = (0, 1, 1/2), F3 = (1, 1, 0).
Then,
M(F ) =





Now, D(F ) = {(1, 1, 0)} so that F is balanced and partitionable. 
6.1. Stability of fractional families
We turn now to extend the notion of stability to families of fractional coalitions.
To this end, given a familyF of f -coalitions and y ∈ D(F ), letFy be the family of all possible f -disjoint unions of elements
of supp(y,F ), and consider the (fractional) characteristic function vy : [0, 1]N → R defined by
vy(F) =
{
0 if there is no F ′ ∈ supp(y,F ) such that F ′ @ F ,
max{σ(F ′) : F ′ ∈ Fy, F ′ @ F} otherwise.
Similar to Lemma 3.1, for any f -coalition F we have:
0 ≤ vy(F) ≤ σ(F),
vy(F) = σ(F) if and only if F ∈ Fy,
and for K ⊂ N ,
vy(Kf ) ≤ |N|,
vy(Kf ) = |Kf | if and only if Kf ∈ Fy.
Wemay reproduce many of the results of Section 3.
Definition 6.11. A family F of f -coalitions is stable if either it is unbalanced or C(vy,F ) 6= ∅ for all y ∈ D(F ). 
Lemma 6.12. A balanced family F of f -coalitions is stable if and only if
z∗(vy,F ) = max{vy(K) · y′ : y′ ∈ D(F )} ≤ vy(Nf ) for all y ∈ D(F ). (6.13)
The following is a variation of a part of the proof of Theorem 3.5:
Lemma 6.14. Let F be a balanced and stable family of f -coalitions, and let y ∈ D(F ). Then,
vy(Nf ) = σ(Nf ) = |N|.
In particular, there exists a subfamily of f -coalitions F̂ ⊂ supp(y,F ), such that
Nf = unionsqF ∈̂F F .























1 = |N| since y ∈ D(F )
≥ vy(Nf ) by definition of vy.
Hence, equality holds throughout. 
Theorem 6.15. If a family F of f -coalitions is stable, then it is partitionable.
Proof. IfF is unbalanced, the result follows from the definitions, so let us assume thatF is balanced.We have to show that
if y is an extreme point of D(F ), then y is 0–1.
Given y ∈ D(F ), we may find a f -partition F̂ ⊂ Fy using Lemma 6.14, and then construct the corresponding 0–1 vector
ŷ ∈ D(F ) as in Eq. (6.6), satisfying supp(̂y,F ) = F̂ .
Letm ∈ Z,m > 1, be such thatmy is integral, and consider
y = 1
m− 1 (my− ŷ).






If y is an extreme point of D(F )we must have y = ŷ, and hence y is 0–1. 
Mimicking the definition ofW-functions (Definition 3.8), we set:
Definition 6.16. Given a family F of f -coalitions, a function v : F → R is aWf -function (for the family F ) if∑
F∈F̂
v(F) ≤ v(Nf ) for all f -partitions F̂ ⊂ F .
(If there is no f -partition contained in F , then any characteristic function is aWf -function.) 
Theorem 6.17 (cf. Theorem 3.10). If the f -family F is partitionable, then C(v,F ) 6= ∅ for everyWf -function v.
Proof. Is similar to that of Theorem 3.10. 
Theorem 6.18. A family F of f -coalitions is stable if and only if it is partitionable.
6.2. Addition of players
It is not difficult to extend some of the results in Section 4 to fractional coalitions, and obtain the following, whose proofs
we omit.
Lemma 6.19. If the f -family F is unstable, adding a dummy player always makes the family stable and unbalanced.
Theorem 6.20. If D(F ) 6= ∅ and we add a mediator, then F ′ is balanced if and only if Nf ∈ F .
Let us now consider the addition of several players to f -coalitions in order to obtain stability when the family includes
the singleton coalitions. That is, the family is of the form F = F0 ∪ [N]f , where with [N]f we denote the family of all the
f -coalitions of the form ei, i = 1, . . . , n (recall that these are the vectors of the canonical basis in Rn).
Following what we did in Section 5.1, when extending the family first we include the individual coalitions formed by the
added players. Thus, if the new set of players is N ′, the new family of coalitions is of the form F ′ = F ′0 ∪ [N ′]f and the new
players are added to (some of) the coalitions in F0.
Unlike the case of 0–1 participation of players to coalitions, we cannot reduce the study of the polyhedron D(F ) to the
study of P(F0) = {x ≥ 0 : M(F0)x ≤ 1}, since there is not a one-to-one correspondence between the integer points in both
polyhedra.
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Example 6.21. Consider N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and F0 = {F1, F2, F3, F4, F5}where
F1 = (1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1/2), F2 = (1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1/2), F3 = (0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1/2),




1 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 1
1 0 0 0 1
1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
 .
Now, although P(F0) is an integral polyhedron, D(F ) is not, since
(1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1/2), (0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1/2), (0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1/2),
(0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1/2), (0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1/2)
are some of its extreme points. 
Therefore, in order to analyze the possibility of adding players to a family of f -coalitions to obtain stability we have to
study the polyhedron D(F ).
Example 6.22. Let N = {1, . . . , 5} andK = C5 ∪ [N]where
C5 = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}, {3, 4}, {4, 5}, {5, 1}},
is the cycle of length 5.
This family is clearly unstable. Moreover,M(C5) is the clique-nodematrix of the graph C5 which is not a perfect graph. By
Theorem 5.1, it is not possible to add a set of players and obtain a stable family preserving the set of partitions. Nevertheless,
it might be reasonable to consider P(C5)∗ = {x ≥ 0 : Ax ≤ 1}where
A =

1 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 1












This suggests that we may add a player that participates half-time in every coalition. However, if we add this new player
and its individual coalition, the resulting family of f -coalitions coincides with the family in the previous example, which is
unstable. 
At any rate, allowing the addition of players to coalitions with fractional participation and relaxing the individual
rationality of the added players, we can state a result that generalizes Theorem 5.1.
Theorem 6.23. Given an unstable family of coalitionsK = K0 ∪ [N] such that M(K0) is an n×m 0–1matrix, there is a set of
players we can add with a fractional participation in the coalitions of K0, such that the resulting family of f -coalitions is stable.
Proof. Since the familyK is unstable, neither D(K) = {(x, x′) ≥ 0 : M(K0)x+ Ix′ = 1} nor P(K0) are integral polyhedra.
Let P(K0)∗ be the convex hull of the integer solutions in P(K0). Under the hypothesis that M is a non-negative matrix, it
can be proved that P(K0)∗ = {x ≥ 0 : M(K0)x ≤ 1,M ′x ≤ 1}whereM ′ = (m′ij)s×m and 0 ≤ m′ij ≤ 1 (see, e.g., [22]).
Suppose we add the s players i1, . . . , is toK0 in such a way player ik participates with an amount m′kj in j-th coalition,
but we do not add the singleton for these new players. LetK ′f denote this new family of f -coalitions.
Then, D(K ′f ) = {(x, x′) ≥ 0 : M(K0)x + Ix′ = 1,M ′x = 1}. Clearly, there is a one-to-one correspondence between
the extreme points in D(K ′f ) and the extreme points in F = {x ≥ 0 : M(K0)x ≤ 1,M ′x = 1}, intersection of faces of the
integral polyhedron P(K0)∗. If it is not an empty polyhedron, and, sinceM(K0) is 0–1 matrix, if (x, x′) is an extreme point
of D(K ′f ), x′ is also integral. Then, D(K
′
f ) is an integral polyhedron and the extended family of f -coalitionsK
′
f is stable.
If D(K ′f ) is the empty set, the new family is unbalanced and stable. 
Remark 6.24. If in the previous result we arrive to an unbalanced family of coalitions, instead of adding such a set of players
we might find it more convenient to add a dummy player or a mediator instead. 
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Remark 6.25. After the addition of the players, we may arrive at unessential players if the constraints in P(K0) are not
facets of the convex hull of integral solutions P∗(K0). 
Remark 6.26. Note that in Theorem 6.23 we did not ask for individual rationality of the new players. Example 6.22 shows
that this condition cannot be relaxed. 
Example 6.27. Let us consider again the family in Example 6.22 and suppose nowwedo not ask for the individual rationality
of the added player, then
M(F ′) =

1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 0 0 0 0 0
 .
It is easy to check that D(F ′) is a 0–1 polyhedron and thus F ′ is a stable family of f -coalitions. 
The result in Theorem 6.23 does not hold when we consider an unstable family of f -coalitions (instead of coalitions) and
add players (even without asking the individual rationality of the new players), as the following example shows.
Example 6.28. Let F = F0 ∪ [N]f be such that
M(F0) =

1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 0 0 0 0 0

.
It is easy to check that F is unstable, for instance
(0, 1/2, 1/2, 1/2, 1/2, 1/2, 1/2, 1/2, 1/2, 1/2, 1/2, 0, 0, 0, 1/2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
is in D(F ).
Following the notation in Theorem 6.23, M ′ is the matrix having the single row (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1/2, 1/2, 1/2, 1/2, 1/2),
but after adding a new player with this participation in the set of coalitions (and without asking for her/him individual
rationality), the extended family of f -coalitions still is unstable.
For example,
(0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1/2) ∈ D(F ′). 
6.3. Deletion of coalitions and instability indices
Let us conclude this section by making a few remarks on the deletion of f -coalitions in an unstable family in order to
obtain stability, and the corresponding indices.
In the fractional case there is no correspondence between nodes in a graph and f -coalitions, butwe still have that deleting
f -coalitions corresponds to setting variables to zero in the polyhedron D(F ). Therefore, the following result is immediate
Lemma 6.29. Given an unstable family of m f -coalitions F , there is a set of k f -coalitions, 1 ≤ k ≤ m − 1, such that deleting
them from F the resulting family F ′ is stable.
Thus, we can extend the definition of the instability indices of a family of coalitions.
The minimum number of coalitions we have to delete in order to obtain a stable family of f -coalitions, c(Kf ) is well
defined, but, as far as we know, there is no general result for the addition of players.
Nevertheless, from Lemma 6.29, we can define an instability index similar to p(K)whenK = K0 ∪ [N] ifM(K0) is an
n × m matrix and G(M(K0)) is imperfect. More precisely, we can define pf (K) as the minimum number of players (with
fractional participation andwithout individual rationality)we need to add to the family tomake it stable, as in Theorem6.23.
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